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The deterioration in the U.S. balance of payments after 1957 and an accelerating 
loss of gold reserves prompted U.S. monetary authorities to undertake foreign-
exchange-market interventions beginning in 1961.  We discuss the events leading 
up to these interventions, the institutional arrangements developed for that 
purpose, and the controversies that ensued.  Although these interventions 
forestalled a loss of U.S. gold reserves, in the end, they only delayed more 
fundamental adjustments and, in that respect, were a failure. 
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1.  Introduction 
  The officials who signed the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of 
Agreement at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944 envisioned an international 
financial system based on close cooperation, which would foster stability, promote full 
employment, and prevent a return to the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the early 1930s.
1  
Under the agreement, the United States pegged the dollar to gold at $35 per ounce and 
pledged to buy and sell the metal freely at this price.  Other nations established parities 
for their currencies relative to the dollar and were obliged to keep their exchange rates 
within a 1 percent band around the central value through foreign-exchange interventions, 
restraints on financial flows, and ultimately the adoption of compatible monetary 
policies.  When faced with a transitory balance-of-payments problem, a country with 
insufficient reserves to finance its intervention could borrow from the IMF instead of 
quickly instituting deflationary macroeconomic programs.  The ability to borrow reserves 
would also lessen the deficit country’s incentive to impose trade restraints or exchange 
controls on current-account transactions.
2   
Exchange rates were not immutable under the Bretton Woods system.  After IMF 
consultation and approval, countries facing a “fundamental disequilibrium” in their 
balance of payments could adjust their parities.  In principle, the IMF could also insist 
that the country adopt macroeconomic policies consistent with any exchange-rate change, 
but the IMF lacked a credible enforcement mechanism.  Deficit countries, which felt 
pressures to adjust more heavily than surplus countries, postponed devaluation to avoid 
the stigma—one of “failed economic policies”—that devaluation carried.     2
Although the Bretton Woods system began operating in 1946, European 
currencies remained inconvertible for current-account transactions until late 1958, and 
the Japanese yen stayed similarly inconvertible until 1964.  Initially, these war-ravaged 
countries maintained inconvertible currencies as a means of limiting their persistent 
current-account deficits.  Most lacked sufficient international reserves to sustain growing 
deficits for long, even after allowing for IMF credits.  In 1949, the situation compelled 
many European countries to devalue their currencies relative to the dollar.  France 
devalued for a second time in 1957.   
During the 1950s, however, the international position of the war-torn 
industrialized countries greatly improved.  Foreign productivity and competitiveness 
recovered, and Germany began running a sustained balance-of-payments surplus.  
Government grants and long-term financial outflows from the United States created 
persistent balance-of-payments deficits that provided a source of international reserves to 
finance expanding international trade.  A general quota increase in 1959 also augmented 
the IMF funds that were available for temporary balance-of-payments assistance.  
Consequently, by the late 1950s, more than a decade after its beginning, the Bretton 
Woods exchange-rate system became functional.    
At the same time, however, markets and central banks were quickly losing 
confidence in the viability of its underlying parity structure.  Between 1957 and 1961, the 
U.S. balance of payments deteriorated markedly, and the United States began losing gold 
at an alarming rate.  By 1960, total external U.S. dollar liabilities exceeded the U.S. 
monetary gold stock, implying that the United States could not completely honor its 
pledge to sell gold at $35 per ounce.  In an attempt to forestall foreign central banks from   3
converting their excess dollar reserves into gold and to reduce the chances for 
disorderly—possibly self-fulfilling—speculative financial attacks, the U.S. Treasury 
began intervening in the foreign-exchange market in March 1961 after a 20-year hiatus.  
A year later, the Federal Reserve System also started intervening for its own account.
3   
  Economists have long questioned the efficacy of these interventions.  In the 
absence of more fundamental macroeconomic adjustments, these stop-gap operations 
seemed only to delay—and thereby possibly worsen—the inevitable collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system.  Moreover, the Federal Reserve’s decision to intervene raised 
important questions about the legality of its actions and the implications of intervention 
for central-bank independence and monetary-policy credibility.  Many of these questions 
remain as relevant today as they were 45 years ago.
4   
  This article explores the events between 1957 and 1962 that shaped the U.S. 
decision to intervene.  It is the first of three essays on Bretton Woods that will comprise a 
chapter in A History of U.S. Foreign Exchange Market Intervention.  Section 2 argues 
that while in hindsight events at the time seemed to signal a fundamental flaw with the 
Bretton Woods system, one fully consistent with Triffin’s paradox, policy makers at the 
time seemed to view developments as temporary and for that reason turned to stop-gap 
measures—notably exchange-market intervention—to address the emerging U.S. 
balance-of-payments problem (see Triffin, 1957, 1960).  U.S. policy makers thought that 
devaluation was inconsistent with the dollar’s reserve-currency status, and they were 
unwilling to subvert domestic economic objectives to balance-of-payments 
considerations.  They seemed to hope that foreign countries would eventually bear the 
costs of any fundamental adjustment.  Section 3 describes the Treasury’s interventions in   4
1961.  The Treasury’s limited resources for foreign-exchange operations, the similarities 
between these operations and monetary-policy operations, and the perceived success of 
these activities provided a strong impetus for the Federal Reserve’s participation.   
Section 4 investigates the motives behind the Federal Reserve’s decision to intervene, the 
controversies that this decision engendered, and the apparatus that the United States 
eventually established for intervention purposes.  Section 5 concludes.   
2.  A Fundamental Flaw 
  Triffin (1957, 1960) described a fundamental flaw of the Bretton Woods system 
in his famous paradox:
5  The official price of gold was too low to induce growth in the 
world’s gold supply sufficient to meet the expanding demand for international reserves.   
Instead, U.S. balance-of-payments deficits accommodated the excess demand and, 
thereby, promoted the global recovery from the war and subsequent international 
economic growth.  Triffin correctly anticipated that the associated stock of outstanding 
dollar liabilities would eventually exceed the store of U.S. monetary gold.  Consequently, 
the persistent U.S. balance-of-payments deficits—necessary to accommodate growing 
reserve needs—eventually undermined the credibility of the official gold price and the 
entire Bretton Woods parity structure.   
Short of finding a reserves source not tied to U.S. balance-of-payments deficits, 
the major industrialized countries, notably the United States, lacked a viable exit from 
Triffin’s paradox.  Devaluing the dollar (raising the official price of gold) would 
undermine the dollar’s reserve-currency status.  Eliminating the U.S. balance-of-
payments deficit through deflationary macroeconomic policies would stop needed reserve   5
growth and conflict with the domestic U.S. policy objectives of the early 1960s.  The 
United States therefore only acted to delay the collapse that Triffin thought inevitable.   
2.1. Triffin’s Paradox 
The framers of Bretton Woods set the official price of gold at $35 per ounce, the 
same price that the U.S. Gold Reserve Act of 1934 established.  Because of inflation 
during World War II and shortly thereafter, this official price became too low in real 
terms to induce sufficient gold production to meet reserve needs (see Bordo, 1993, James, 
1996, and Meltzer, 2004).  By the early 1950s, the real price of gold was only half of its 
1934 value (see figure 1).
6   Between 1948 and 1958, the free world’s gold stock 
increased only 16% while its imports rose 68% (see Triffin, 1960, table 14, pp. 72-3).   
The United States, however, provided needed liquidity by running persistent 
balance-of-payments deficits.  Between 1950 and 1957, these deficits averaged $1.3 
billion per year, as government grants, private remittances, and long-term financial 
outflows typically exceeded surpluses elsewhere in the accounts (figure 2).
7  Neither the 
United States nor the international financial community seemed to view these deficits 
with much concern because they stemmed from postwar redevelopment efforts and from 
the provision of military security.  Without the international reserves that these deficits 
provided, the postwar recovery of global trade and world economic activity would have 
proceeded more slowly, because countries facing even temporary balance-of-payments 
deficits would quickly need to deflate, devalue, or impose disruptive trade and financial 
restraints.   
By the early 1960s, however, the total external dollar liabilities associated with 
the persistent U.S. balance-of-payments deficits began to exceed the U.S. gold stock,   6
implying that the United States could not completely fulfill its obligation to sell gold at 
the official price (see figure 3).  The very act of providing needed liquidity was itself 
creating uncertainty about the long-term viability of the parity structure, hence, Triffin’s 
paradox.  At the time, however, few interpreted the situation as necessarily leading to the 
demise of the Bretton Woods system.
8   
An outflow of gold accompanied the U.S. balance-of-payments deficits during the 
1950s but seemed a reasonable reversal of the substantial—largely safe-haven—gold 
acquisitions that the United States experienced in the 1930s and 1940s.  The United 
States, which held 60 percent of the world’s gold reserves in 1950, lost only $213 million 
worth of gold on average each year between 1950 and 1957 (figure 4).
9  During that time, 
foreign countries increased their gold reserves mainly out of free-world gold production 
and through small purchases from the Soviet Union.  In addition, the IMF sold the United 
States $800 million worth of gold between 1951 and 1957 (Board of Governors, 1963, p. 
422). 
Between 1958 and 1960, however, U.S. balance-of-payments deficits widened to 
$3.7 billion per year on average as surpluses on U.S. goods and services trade narrowed 
slightly and as long-term financial outflows increased sharply.  The most disturbing 
aspect of the expanding U.S. balance-of-payments deficits, however, occurred with 
respect to short-term financial flows beginning in 1960.  Heretofore, the United States 
had typically experienced small short-term financial inflows (including unrecorded 
items), but in 1960 the country witnessed a large outflow of nearly $2.5 billion.  
Although U.S. balance-of-payments deficits narrowed somewhat in 1961 and 1962,   7
substantial outflows of short-term financial capital, often motivated by exchange-rate 
concerns, generally persisted.   
Between 1958 and 1962, the average U.S. gold loss increased sixfold to nearly 
$1.4 billion per year.  The U.S. gold stock declined by $6.8 billion or 30% as foreign 
countries converted dollar reserves into gold.
10  The heavy gold losses would not have 
been so disturbing to U.S. policy makers if they had not been accompanied by evidence 
of a run on the dollar.  Foreign monetary authorities were not only converting new 
acquisitions of dollars into gold, but they were also converting—or planning to convert—
a substantial portion of their existing dollar balances (FOMC, Minutes, January 10, 
1961).   
Between 1957 and 1962, the proportion of international reserves held in gold by 
non-Communist countries increased from 45 percent to 49 percent (Board of Governors, 
1963, p. 423).  European countries, particularly France, Italy, and Germany, accounted 
for almost all of this gain; most other countries kept the share of their gold reserves fairly 
constant (Board of Governors, 1963, p.424).  Despite the accelerated gold losses, the 
United States still held $16 billion worth of gold reserves in 1962, approximately two-
fifths of the world’s gold stock.
11   
On October 20, 1960, the price of gold on the London market shot above the 
official U.S. gold price to $40 per ounce, as private demand for gold reached record 
levels.  Among the factors creating a strong demand for gold was the market’s concern 
that if John F. Kennedy became president, he would focus on expansionary domestic 
policy, rather than on the nation’s deteriorating balance-of-payments position and 
accelerating gold losses.  Kennedy subsequently promised, both as a candidate and as   8
president, to maintain convertibility at the official price, and the premium in the London 
market disappeared by February 1961.  But October 20, 1960, was a turning point of 
sorts.  Henceforth, as we will document, both gold and foreign-exchange markets would 
remain vulnerable to speculative pressures consistent with Triffin’s paradox.   
2.2.  The U.S. Policy Dilemma    
  If the emerging U.S. balance-of-payments problems were indeed evidence of a 
fundamental disequilibrium, the United States had to undertake a real dollar depreciation. 
Hemmed in by the perception of weak domestic demand, constrained by the dollar’s 
unique role in the Bretton Woods system, and still uncertain about the true underlying 
nature of recent balance-of-payments problems, none of the standard methods for 
achieving a real dollar depreciation seemed, at the time, viable or even appropriate.  
Instead, U.S. policy makers in the early 1960s opted for a number of stop-gap policies, of 
which exchange-market interventions would be the most enduring.   
  The Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations did not respond to the widening 
balance-of-payments deficits, short-term capital outflows, and accelerating gold losses in 
a manner suggesting that they viewed these disconcerting developments as evidence of a 
fundamental disequilibrium in the U.S. international accounts.  Instead, policy makers 
attributed the worsening U.S. balance-of-payments position between 1957 and 1962, by 
and large, to transitory factors stemming from U.S. military and economic aid 
commitments, recent cyclical developments, and the re-emergence of Western Europe 
and Japan as global competitors.  The United States would undertake a series of policy 
initiatives to hasten adjustment in the U.S. trade and long-term financial accounts and to   9
improve the operation of the international financial system.  These initiatives, however, 
were not those of policy makers who interpreted the current situation as critical.   
U.S. policy makers also appreciated that with the maturation of the Bretton 
Woods system—economic recovery abroad, growing currency convertibility and an 
adequate pool of liquidity—short-term financial flows could henceforth be more sensitive 
to international interest-rate differentials and exchange-rate uncertainty.  They seemed to 
believe, however, that once the transitory adjustments to the U.S. trade and long-term 
financial accounts were complete, credibility in the dollar could soon return.  After all, 
reserve gains in France and Italy since 1957 illustrated how quickly countries’ 
international positions could change (Board of Governors, 1963).  Renewed credibility in 
the dollar would lessen the problem of short-term financial flows.   
Even if U.S. policy makers had glimpsed emerging events as evidence that the 
U.S. balance-of-payments position was unsustainable, they were unwilling to make the 
appropriate policy adjustments in the early 1960s.  A fundamental disequilibrium would 
imply that the dollar was overvalued on a real basis and that a real depreciation was 
necessary to restore equilibrium to the U.S. balance of payments.  The United States 
could achieve a real depreciation only through a nominal dollar devaluation, a deflation 
in the United States, an inflation in the rest of the world, a general revaluation of foreign 
currencies, or some combination of all four.  Whereas U.S. policy makers might have 
welcomed a higher rate of inflation abroad, and whereas they actively encouraged the 
revaluation of currencies in surplus countries, they were unwilling to alter the official 
gold price or to dampen aggregate demand in the United States for balance-of-payments 
purposes.   10
  A one-time nominal dollar devaluation was simply out of the question.  By 
imposing wealth losses on central banks and individuals that held open positions in U.S. 
dollars, any dollar devaluation would forever threaten the reserve-currency status of the 
U.S. dollar.  Moreover, short-term financial outflows might actually increase if a one-
time devaluation proved insufficient for balance-of-payments adjustment, or if other 
countries simultaneously devalued their currencies against the dollar.  The U.S. also 
opposed an increase in the gold price because it would specifically benefit South Africa 
and the Soviet Union, the two major gold producers (FOMC, Task Force Paper #3, 1990, 
p. 10).  For these reasons, the Kennedy administration went to considerable lengths to 
convince markets of its commitment to the official gold price.  
  Similarly, administration and Federal Reserve policy makers, who still operated in 
the long shadow of the Great Depression, were unwilling to dampen aggregate demand 
for balance-of-payments purposes.  Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta President Malcolm 
Bryan seems to have typified the view, at least as it prevailed among many Federal 
Reserve policy makers:   
“…the last time the System reacted in its policy decisions primarily 
because of foreign developments was…in 1931.  At that time, with 
unemployment constantly increasing and with every element in the 
domestic economy calling for ease, the System responded by 
tightening in order to protect the gold supply.” [FOMC Minutes, 
January 10, 1961, p.41] 
   
He, like many other policy makers, feared a replay of the past.  The United States had 
experienced back-to-back recessions from the third quarter of 1957 through the first 
quarter of 1958 and again from the second quarter of 1960 through the first quarter of 
1961.  These cost the Republicans the election in 1960.  Kennedy pledged to “get the 
country moving again.”  The unemployment rate remained stubbornly high, and President   11
Kennedy’s Council of Economic Advisors expected U.S. economic activity to remain 
below its potential level through 1963.  Policy makers would not undertake deflationary 
macroeconomic programs.   
While the overall thrust of macroeconomic policy was to promote the growth of 
aggregate demand, international considerations did exert some influence on the contours 
of both fiscal and monetary policies in the early 1960s.  Under the Kennedy 
administration, the federal budget shifted from a surplus of $0.3 billion in 1960 to deficits 
of $3.4 billion in 1961, $7.2 billion in 1962, and $4.8 billion in 1963.
12  In 1962, the 
administration introduced an investment tax credit and liberalized depreciation 
allowances primarily to spur aggregate demand, but the administration also thought that 
these tax cuts could improve the country’s international competitiveness.   
For its part, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) eased policy in 1960 
and early 1961, initially by cutting the official discount rate, then by injecting reserves 
through open-market operations and allowing banks to count vault cash as reserves.  The 
FOMC maintained a generally accommodative policy stance—sometimes under pressure 
from the Kennedy administration—at least throughout mid-1963.  Some economists have 
suggested, however, that Federal Reserve policy would have been even more 
accommodative during this period had balance-of-payments concerns not constrained the 
FOMC.  Hetzel (1996, pp. 23-24), for example, suggests that the FOMC allowed short 
rates to rise somewhat in 1961 and 1962 because of concern about external deficits, and 
Meltzer (1991, p. 59) allows that the 1961-62 period might represent a “possible 
exception” to an overall excessively accommodative monetary policy in the early 1960s.    12
Pauls (1990, p. 895) contends that a discount rate hike in July 1963 was designed to 
offset financial outflows stemming from higher rates abroad.
13   
Short-term capital outflows did affect how the Federal Reserve conducted 
monetary policy in the early 1960s, even if they did not alter the overall thrust of 
monetary policy very much.  Since April 1953, except for brief periods of extreme 
market disorder as in 1955 and 1958, the Federal Reserve had operated under a “bills 
only” doctrine; that is, the Federal Reserve confined open-market operations to the very 
short end of the market for U.S. Treasury securities.  Faced with a potential conflict 
between domestic and balance-of-payments objectives, the Federal Reserve and, later, the 
Kennedy administration undertook a program intended to promote domestic investment 
and economic growth through lower long-term interest rates and to discourage short-term 
financial outflows through higher short-term interest rates (Martin, 1961).
14  After 
October 1960, the System began to purchase longer-term securities, while sometimes 
selling Treasury bills.  The Treasury began issuing more short-term securities and 
government trust funds increased the portion of long-term securities in their portfolios 
(Yeager, 1966, p. 448).  In this way, policy makers hoped to twist the yield curve for 
balance-of-payments purposes while maintaining an overall accommodative policy 
stance.   
2.3.  Stop-Gap Policies 
  Although U.S. policy makers were unwilling to devalue the dollar or reduce U.S. 
aggregate demand for balance-of-payments purposes, they instituted a number of policies 
designed to improve the country’s competitive position and, thereby, improve the U. S. 
balance of payments.  Both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, for example,   13
attributed postwar balance-of-payments deficits primarily to the United States’ unusual 
military-assistance and economic-development programs.  These initiatives sought to 
achieve important foreign-policy objectives, and cutting them could have had severe 
political and military consequences in the antagonistic Cold War environment (Gavin, 
2004).  To mitigate the effects of these programs on the U.S. balance of payments, the 
Kennedy administration, often using the threat of troop redeployment, extended the 
requirements, initially developed under the Eisenhower administration, that tied military 
and development assistance to purchases of U.S. goods and services (Gavin, 2004).  The 
United States also encouraged countries to hasten the repayment of their war debts and to 
contribute aid to developing nations.   
  After European currencies became convertible in 1958, U.S. traded goods came 
under more intense competitive pressures.  In response, the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
administrations lobbied for the removal of discriminatory trade practices that foreign 
countries leveled primarily against the United States.  The United States had long 
tolerated these restraints as means of promoting European and Japanese development and 
of conserving international reserves.  The Kennedy administration also undertook various 
efforts to promote exports through U.S. embassies and the Export-Import Bank and to 
reduce the duty-free allowance for U.S. tourists.  In 1961, the Kennedy administration 
also revised the depreciation schedule, hoping to raise U.S. manufacturing productivity, 
improve international competitiveness, and promote exports.   
While undertaking policy initiatives to improve the United States’ international 
competitive position, policy makers here and abroad attempted to shore up Bretton 
Woods institutions against short-term capital flight and destabilizing reserve losses and to   14
foster closer cooperation among the major developed countries.  A major initiative was 
the General Arrangements to Borrow.  With short-term financial flows larger, more 
mobile, and increasingly driven by uncertainties about exchange rates, countries—
notably the United States and the United Kingdom—might need to borrow foreign 
exchange reserves to quell temporary balance-of-payments problems.  Under existing 
quota arrangements, however, the IMF might not have sufficient foreign exchange to 
meet the need for specific currencies.  In late 1962, the major developed countries—the 
G10 and later Switzerland—instituted a new credit mechanism, the General 
Arrangements to Borrow, within the IMF.  These countries collectively pledged $6 
billion (equivalent) of their currencies to meet borrowing requests through the IMF 
(James, 1996, pp. 161-165).   
  To address the strong private demand for gold, President Eisenhower issued an 
order in January 1961 forbidding U.S. residents from holding gold abroad and directing 
any citizen holding gold to sell it by July.  More importantly, in 1961, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and six continental European countries formed the “Gold Pool.”  
These countries sold gold to the market in 1961 to keep the London price of gold in line 
with the official price.  By early 1962, the London price of gold stabilized, and the Pool 
bought back the gold that it previously sold.  Thereafter, through November 1968, the 
Gold Pool operated on both sides of the market, selling gold to eliminate opportunities 
for central banks to arbitrage between the U.S. Treasury and the London market and 
buying gold from producers as a consortium.
15   
All of these initiatives attempted to address important aspects of the U.S. balance-
of-payments problem.  None, however, was capable of immediately offsetting speculative   15
financial flows.  These could arise suddenly.  They drew down needed dollar reserves 
from some countries and provided others with unwanted balances, which they might 
exchange for U.S. gold.  If unchecked, sudden speculative pressures could prove self-
fulfilling and present contagion problems for otherwise sound currencies.  To address 
these short-term speculative financial flows, the United States began intervening in 1961.   
3.  The U.S. Treasury’s Decision to Intervene
16    
  In early March 1961, Germany and the Netherlands revalued their currencies.  
These revaluations prompted funds to move out of British pounds and into German marks 
and Swiss francs, the latter being another strong candidate for revaluation.  Although the 
dollar was not the chief target of this speculative surge, it was the key vehicle currency, 
and the massive reshuffling of funds through dollars resulted in heavy concentrations of 
dollars in foreign central banks, which might seek to convert these dollars into gold.  In 
October 1961, the Berlin Wall crisis sparked a further round of speculative financial 
flows and put additional pressure on the dollar.  The U.S. Treasury, with the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York as its agent, sought to counter these speculative flows and to 
forestall a potential drain of U.S. monetary gold through exchange-market intervention.   
  The Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) began to intervene in March 1961 for the 
first time since World War II.
17  Treasury operations consisted primarily of forward sales 
of continental currencies, which were designed to reduce forward premia on these 
currencies.  Forward premia served as barometers of market confidence in the dollar, and 
when a forward premium exceeded the level consistent with its associated interest-rate 
differential, it provided a strong incentive for financial flows.     16
Forward transactions offered the Treasury a number of advantages.  For one thing, 
the Treasury, which had only $336 million in assets available for intervention in mid-
1961, did not need to commit scarce foreign-currency reserves to a transaction until the 
contract’s maturity date and then only if the position incurred a loss.
18  That, however, 
was unlikely.  Since the ESF sold foreign currencies forward at known premia over 
official spot rates, the United States could only incur a substantial loss if the foreign 
currencies were revalued.
19  The ESF typically covered its forward sales against that 
contingency.    
The Treasury also undertook some limited spot transactions in 1961.  These were 
largely experimental, designed to learn how the market operated and to gauge the impact 
of such operations on speculative activity. 
3.1.  German Mark Interventions 
  On March 6 and 7, 1961, Germany and the Netherlands, respectively, revalued 
their currencies by approximately 5 percent, a smaller amount than market participants 
anticipated.  Within days, funds flowed out of British sterling and, to a lesser extent, out 
of dollars, and into continental currencies, especially German marks and Swiss francs.  
British authorities sold dollars in defense of sterling.  The speculative attack and Britain’s 
defensive dollar sales inflated dollar holdings at continental central banks and threatened 
to push their dollar-to-gold reserve ratios above acceptable levels.  In addition to adding 
to the potential demand for U.S. monetary gold, the heavy speculative flows pushed the 
dollar to a substantial forward discount against many of the European currencies, which 
tended only to reinforce expectations of further revaluations.  Moreover, the limited 
availability of forward cover induced many market participants with dollar receivables to   17
borrow dollars in New York or in the Eurodollar market and use these funds to buy marks 
in the spot market (Coombs, September 1962, p. 1141).  This hedging strategy added 
further to foreign central banks’ dollar reserves.   
On Monday, March 13, 1961, after consultations with Bundesbank and Federal 
Reserve officials, the ESF began selling German marks forward in an attempt to reduce 
the forward premium on marks, which had reached a peak of 4 percent, and, hopefully, to 
stabilize exchange-rate fluctuations in both the spot and forward markets.  A so-called 
“parallel” agreement covered the Treasury’s risk exposure.  Accordingly, the Bundesbank 
would supply the U.S. Treasury with any marks that it might need to fulfill the forward 
contracts, and the U.S. Treasury and the Bundesbank would split any profits.  The 
forward sales reached $63 million per week by the second week of the operations and 
continued at a rate of $30 million to $40 million per week for several weeks thereafter.  
The operations reached a peak of $320 million in mid-June, but then fell off quickly (U.S. 
Treasury, Experience, 1962, p. 4).   
The Treasury also concluded an arrangement with the German government 
whereby Germany would immediately prepay $100 million of its $587 million debt due 
to the United States in April 1961.
20  The ESF received $50 million of this amount for 
interventions.  The ESF used most of it as cover for forward transactions but made small 
intervention sales of German marks in the New York market during June and July to lift 
the dollar off of its floor vis-à-vis the mark.  The Treasury coordinated these operations 
with the Bundesbank’s interventions.  The Treasury sold the remaining $50 million worth 
of German marks from the debt prepayment directly to the Bundesbank on September 1,   18
1962, thereby reducing the potential drain on U.S. monetary gold (U.S. Treasury, 
Experience, 1962, p. 5).  
When the Soviets built the Berlin wall in August 1961, a substantial amount of 
funds quickly moved out of Germany.  This reversal of financial flows provided a source 
for funding the U.S. Treasury’s forward commitments, which, unlike the “parallel 
agreement,” would not cause the Bundesbank to again acquire excess dollars.  By mid-
December 1961, all of the forward mark commitments were liquidated, and although the 
ESF incurred small losses on its spot transactions, the overall operation accrued a $750 
thousand profit (U.S. Treasury, Experience, 1962, p. 5). 
The success of the German mark operations convinced U.S. Treasury officials 
that such cooperative arrangements could provide a “first line of defense” for the dollar.  
With the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit continuing, further speculative attacks seemed 
certain.  Consequently, the ESF acquired additional German marks from the market when 
the Berlin crisis temporarily weakened that currency.  The ESF made further forward 
mark sales in late December 1961 when that currency’s forward premium again rose 
above 1 percent against the dollar.  By the end of January 1962, the ESF held $55 million 
worth of German marks, of which $50 million (equivalent) were invested in German 
Treasury bills.  Forward commitments amounted to $10 million (equivalent).  Of these, 
“parallel” agreements with the Bundesbank covered $5.6 million (equivalent), and ESF 
mark holdings covered the remainder (U.S. Treasury, Experience, 1962, pp. 6-7).  The 
U.S. Treasury liquidated its forward commitments in German marks by the end of March 
1962.     19
3.2.  Swiss Franc Interventions 
In early 1961, dollar inflows were increasing liquidity in the Swiss banking 
system and raising the dollar-to-gold ratio at the Swiss National Bank (SNB) above its 
legal limit.  Instead of converting the excess dollar reserves immediately into gold with 
the U.S. Treasury, the SNB lent dollars to the Bank of England to finance Britain’s 
pound-stabilization program.  The Bank of England, however, was arranging financing 
through the IMF, which would permit it to liquidate its dollar credit with the SNB 
(Coombs, September 1962).  Some mechanism was needed to reduce the excess liquidity 
in Switzerland stemming from these dollar inflows.   
The SNB believed that the inflow of funds was a temporary phenomenon and that 
forward sales of Swiss francs could stem or possibly reverse this inflow by reducing the 
forward premium on francs.  Swiss law, however, prohibited the central bank from 
operating in the forward market.  On July 12, 1961, the ESF began forward sales of Swiss 
francs in the market through the SNB.  The ESF intended to use $15 million worth of 
Swiss francs, which it had acquired earlier from the SNB, as cover for the operation, but 
the SNB also agreed to provide additional Swiss franc cover against Treasury gold sales 
at a fixed price based on the existing franc-dollar exchange rate. 
These initial foreign-exchange operations were small and mainly experimental, 
but after the Berlin crisis in August 1961 sharply increased dollar flows into Switzerland, 
the ESF’s forward Swiss franc sales increased substantially to a peak of $152.5 million 
(equivalent) by the end of November.  In September, the SNB had provided the U.S. 
Treasury with a SF430 million ($100 million) credit line to cover the ESF’s forward 
commitments.  To draw on this line, the U.S. Treasury issued $46 million (equivalent) of   20
certificates of indebtedness denominated in Swiss francs in October 1961—the first time 
that it had issued foreign-currency-denominated debt since World War I.  The Treasury 
issued the certificates in two lots, at a rate of 1.25% with a three-month maturity.  The 
ESF received $15 million (equivalent) from the proceeds to meet Swiss franc forward 
commitments, and the Treasury’s General Fund kept the remaining $31 million worth of 
francs with the SNB.  The Treasury rolled over one lot of certificates and repaid the 
other, as pressure on the Swiss franc subsided.  In addition to these Treasury activities, 
the SNB doubled its dollar working balances to $200 million and, thereby, reduced the 
potential gold drain that the U.S. Treasury faced (U.S. Treasury, Experience, 1962, pp. 7-
8).   
The Treasury viewed the Swiss franc operation as highly successful, contending 
that without it, the United States would have lost somewhere between $250 million and 
$400 million in monetary gold (U.S. Treasury, Experience, 1962, p. 8).  At the end of 
January 1962, the Treasury had $146.5 million (equivalent) outstanding Swiss franc 
forward contracts.  Profits on the operation amounted to $450 thousand.   
In February 1962, the Swiss franc began to weaken, requiring the SNB to support 
it with dollar sales.  To acquire the necessary dollar balances, the SNB sold the Treasury 
$73.5 million in gold and $93.2 million in Swiss francs through May 1962.
21  Part of the 
Swiss franc purchases ($28.1 million equivalent) were on a swap basis.
22  The Treasury 
used Swiss franc balances to liquidate forward commitments and the certificates of 
indebtedness as they matured. (Coombs, September 1962, p. 1145).    21
3.3.  Netherlands guilder Intervention 
In September 1961, the U.S. Treasury purchased $15 million (equivalent) of 
Netherlands guilder, most of which it invested in guilder securities.  With these funds 
providing cover, the Treasury undertook $4.9 million (equivalent) in forward sales of 
guilder through the Netherlands Bank in the Dutch market beginning in January 1962.  In 
February, the Treasury acquired an additional $15 million guilder (equivalent), raising its 
total to $30 million, and expanded its forward operations (U.S. Treasury, Experience, 
1962, p. 10).  Treasury forward guilder sales in January and February 1962 reached $20.8 
million (equivalent) (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1963).  In July 1962, Britain 
made a large drawing of guilder from the IMF, which it used to buy dollars from the 
Netherlands Bank.  To replenish its dollar reserves, the Netherlands Bank sold $20 
million guilder (equivalent) to the Treasury under a temporary swap agreement (Coombs, 
September 1962, p. 1145).    
3.4.  Italian Lira Interventions 
In 1961, strong dollar inflows pushed the Italian lira to its upper parity limit and 
kindled rumors of a revaluation.  As Italy’s dollar-to-gold reserve ratio rose, Italian 
authorities undertook dollar swaps with domestic commercial banks.  The authorities 
would sell dollars for lira spot to the commercial banks and simultaneously buy them 
back at an established forward exchange rate.  Italian authorities would then use the 
newly acquired lira to buy dollars from the same commercial banks.  At the conclusion of 
the swap transactions, the commercial banks held exactly the same amount of dollars, but 
their holdings were now covered by a promise to deliver lira for dollars in the future at a 
set exchange rate.  The temporary cover that these swaps provided to the Italian   22
commercial banks encouraged them to hold dollar balances instead of converting them to 
lira at the Bank of Italy.  The transactions could be renewed.   
In January 1962, the U.S. Treasury took over $200 million of these swaps, 
obligating it to deliver lira forward.  The Treasury obtained cover for its commitments 
through a $150 million (equivalent) credit line with Italian authorities.  The Treasury 
acquired an additional $100 million of these swap obligations in March.  In early 1962, 
the Treasury also undertook some experimental spot lira transactions (U.S. Treasury, 
Experience, 1962, pp. 10-11).     
3.5.  Gold Swaps  
In addition to these transactions, the U.S. Treasury undertook a series of three-
month gold swaps with the Swiss National Bank and with the Bank of England in 1961.  
In March, the Treasury sold gold to the SNB for $25 million (equivalent) Swiss francs 
under an agreement to reverse the transaction on June 30.  At maturity, the Treasury 
rolled the swap over until July 29, 1961, and also undertook a second $25 million 
(equivalent) gold swap, which it reversed on July 13, 1961.  The Treasury undertook a 
$50 million (equivalent) gold swap with the Bank of England in April 1961, which 
matured in equal parts in May and July 1961.   
The purpose of these gold swaps is not entirely clear.  The Treasury reports that: 
“These gold transactions were undertaken at U.S. initiative and were designed to smooth 
out random short-run fluctuations in the Treasury’s gold stock.” (U.S. Treasury, 
Experience, 1962, pp. 11-12).  That may be, but another objective—particularly in the 
Swiss case—may have been to keep the ratio of dollar reserves to gold below levels that 
may have required these countries to exchange dollars for U.S. gold.     23
4.  The Federal Reserve’s Decision to Intervene
23   
Both the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System viewed the Treasury’s 
exchange-market interventions in 1961 and early 1962 as unmitigated successes (FOMC 
Minutes, September 9, 1961, p. 44).  The Treasury had acted against short-term 
speculative movements of funds and easily—and profitably—unwound its positions 
when those speculative pressures reversed.   
The ability of the U.S. Treasury to mount another broader dollar defense, 
however, was severely limited.  By late 1962, the ESF had assets equal to approximately 
$340 million, but a large portion of this was committed to stabilization agreements with 
Latin American countries.  This left the ESF with a paltry $100 million equivalent in 
European currencies and only about $20 million to $25 million available for acquiring 
additional foreign exchange.
24   
The Treasury welcomed and encouraged the Federal Reserve’s participation in 
foreign-exchange-market interventions primarily because it would increase the amount of 
funds available for such operations.
25  Since March 1961, the Federal Reserve had 
sharpened its expertise in the area as the agent for the U.S. Treasury and foreign central 
banks.  The Treasury already had access to the Fed’s expertise.  What the Treasury 
needed was the Fed’s capacity to acquire additional foreign exchange.   
On February 13, 1962, the FOMC authorized intervention in the foreign-exchange 
market for the System’s own account.  By participating with the Treasury, the Fed hoped 
to reassert, and possibly extend, its dormant influence in this area.  In fact, Chairman 
Martin may have wanted to bring the entire foreign-exchange operation into the Federal 
Reserve’s bailiwick (FOMC, Minutes, March 6, 1962, p. 72).  Foreign-exchange   24
transactions closely paralleled and often interacted with domestic monetary-policy 
operations, so much so that many countries viewed intervention as solely a central-bank 
function.  The Federal Reserve Act did not explicitly preclude such activities, and indeed 
the System had undertaken foreign-exchange operations in the past.  One way or another, 
U.S. foreign-exchange operations were going forward, and the System wanted to shape 
their development.   
  To be sure, support for intervention within the System at the time was not 
unanimous.  The debates at the FOMC meetings in late 1961 and early 1962 raised issues 
that would resurface periodically over the next 35 years, with the exception that as time 
went on, dissenters became more concerned about the adverse interactions between 
intervention and monetary policy and less concerned about its legality than they were in 
the early 1960s.  But a clear majority of FOMC members have always favored System 
foreign-exchange operations, provided that they did not make the Fed in any way 
subservient to the Treasury, that they did not raise the ire of Congress, and that they did 
not interfere with the domestic objectives of monetary policy.   
4.1.  Legal Authority for System Interventions 
  At their September 12, 1961, meeting, FOMC members first formally discussed 
System participation in foreign-exchange operations.  Chairman William McChesney 
Martin, with strong support from the New York Federal Reserve Bank, advocated the 
System’s participation.  To his mind, there was “no question but that this country was 
going to be in the business of foreign-exchange operations,” and he wanted the Federal 
Reserve involved either alone, or in conjunction with the U.S. Treasury (FOMC, Minutes, 
September 12, 1961, p. 44).     25
Martin contended that the public did not distinguish between the Federal Reserve 
and the U.S. Treasury in these matters.  Moreover, congressmen had already asked him 
informally if the Fed approved of the Treasury’s actions, which he interpreted as 
indicating that the Fed’s opinion was important in these matters.  To Martin, participating 
was imperative, even if the Fed’s role was very limited.  He realized, however, “that the 
primary direction must come from the Treasury and that everything done by the Federal 
Reserve must be coordinated with the Treasury,” but apparently Martin did not think this 
threatened the System’s independence (FOMC, Minutes, September 12, 1961, p. 49).  
Martin always contended that the Federal Reserve was independent within the 
government and was not independent of the government.  His distinction implied that the 
System must coordinate and cooperate with the Treasury as far as possible and 
particularly in government actions that did not directly interfere with monetary-policy 
decisions (see Bremner, 2004, and Meltzer, 2005).   
The FOMC’s primary concern was Congress, whose opinion about Fed 
intervention in the foreign-exchange market had never been unequivocal and firm.  In the 
current climate, if all went smoothly, Congress probably would acquiesce.  Congress was 
aware of the balance-of-payments problem and sympathetic to the policy dilemma that it 
posed.  If the Fed’s operations incurred a substantial loss or appeared to interfere with 
foreign policy, however, the System’s relations with Congress could deteriorate.  
Legislative support for the operations was necessary.  At a minimum, the FOMC wanted 
to be sure that its actions were legal.   
The Federal Reserve Act did refer to specific types of foreign-exchange 
transactions, and at least seven times between 1924 and 1929 the Federal Reserve Bank   26
of New York extended credits to foreign central banks to shore up their reserves in 
defense of their currencies (FOMC, Task Force Paper #1, 1990, pp. 4-5).  In 1925, for 
example, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York made $200 million worth of gold 
available to the Bank of England with the understanding that the Bank of England would 
place proceeds from any gold sales in a sterling investment account for the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York.  In 1933, however, Senator Carter Glass, whom many 
regarded as the father of the Federal Reserve Act, criticized these transactions, indicating 
that such “stabilization operations” were inconsistent with the original act.  At that time, 
as discussed below, the Board of Governors took a position that was not inconsistent with 
Senator Glass’s view.  In 1934, Congress passed the Gold Reserve Act, establishing the 
ESF specifically for the purpose of intervening (see Bordo, Humpage, and Schwartz, 
forthcoming).  But, in passing the Gold Reserve Act, did Congress mean to preclude the 
Fed from this arena?  
  In 1962, Howard Hackley, the Board of Governors’ general counsel, provided a 
legal interpretation of the Federal Reserve Act that the FOMC would now adopt.  The 
often-cited “Hackley Memo” argued that various sections of the Act—when considered 
together—authorized the Federal Reserve System to hold foreign exchange, to intervene 
in both the spot and forward markets, and to engage in swap transactions with foreign 
central banks and with the U.S. Treasury. 
Section 14 of the Act was the key.  It allowed the System to purchase and sell 
both spot and forward “cable transfers” in both domestic and foreign markets.  Since 
cable transfers were the standard means of acquiring foreign exchange in the early part of 
the century, section 14 seemed to sanction—according to Hackley’s interpretation—both   27
types of foreign-exchange intervention.  More generally, however, section 12A(c) 
instructed the Federal Reserve System to undertake open-market operations—including 
transactions in foreign exchange—that accommodate commerce and business by 
promoting sound credit conditions in the United States.  Defending the dollar, 
cooperating with foreign central banks and the IMF, and promoting trade certainly 
seemed consistent with this general objective.  Section 12A(b) of the Act also specifically 
required the FOMC’s authorization for all such open-market operations.   
In addition, section 14(e) allowed the Federal Reserve to hold foreign exchange in 
the form of open accounts in foreign countries, to appoint correspondents, and to 
establish agencies.
26  These are necessary aspects of an intervention operation, 
particularly if the Federal Reserve hoped to operate through a foreign commercial bank 
or a central bank in a foreign market.  In the 1930s, however, the Board of Governors 
interpreted this clause narrowly, arguing that the Act allowed the System to open 
accounts only to facilitate direct intervention transactions, but that it did not allow the 
System to hold foreign currency beyond what was immediately necessary for 
intervention.  This interpretation seemed to preclude holding foreign-currency positions 
acquired outright or through swaps.  In 1962, Hackley broadened the interpretation, 
arguing that the FOMC instead could construe the Act as allowing the System to maintain 
such accounts provided that it had a reasonable expectation of using them to finance 
intervention (Hackley, 1961, p. 13).  Accordingly, the System regarded section 14(e) as 
authorizing it to undertake swaps with other central banks and eventually to amass a huge 
portfolio of foreign exchange.  Hackley’s interpretation was a clear change in the Board’s   28
attitude and was in agreement with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s original 
actions in the 1930s.
27   
More problematic for the System, however, was finding legal authority for 
purchasing foreign exchange from the ESF and for undertaking swap agreements 
(warehousing) with that agency.
28  The Banking Act of 1935 prohibited the Federal 
Reserve from purchasing government obligations except in the open market.  Although 
Congress had permitted some direct purchases of government securities during World 
War II and although the Fed retained some very limited authority to do so after the war, 
Congress clearly did not want the System lending resources to the Treasury “in a manner 
that might be inconsistent with the System’s monetary and credit responsibilities” 
(Hackley, 1961, p. 18).  Hackley argued that swap agreements with the Treasury did not 
violate the open-market provisions of the Banking Act of 1935.  In contrast to 
government securities, foreign currency was not a liability on the U.S Treasury’s balance 
sheet; therefore, that agency was part of the open market for foreign exchange.  
Moreover, the United States was a “domestic corporation.”  This was a necessary 
criterion because the Federal Reserve Act also limited open-market operations to 
domestic corporations.  In Hackley’s opinion, the System could lawfully buy and sell 
foreign exchange from the ESF or the Treasury.
29  Unlike most of the legal controversies 
associated with Federal Reserve intervention, the debate about the appropriateness of 
warehousing would never quite disappear (see Broddus and Goodfriend, 1996, and 
Hetzel, 1996).  Opponents would consistently argue that warehousing constituted a 
System loan to the ESF using foreign exchange as collateral and was, therefore, 
inappropriate.  It contravened principles of central-bank independence and thereby   29
impinged on the credibility of monetary policy.  Proponents would eventually argue that 
warehousing did not constitute a loan, but instead was a straightforward and permissible 
asset swap between the two agencies.   
4.2.  Other FOMC Objections   
  Aside from the question of the Federal Reserve’s legal authority for intervention, 
four other key issues arose during the FOMC’s discussions in late 1961 and early 1962.  
One was political:  Some members of the FOMC feared that even if the Federal Reserve 
Act did provide legal authority for intervention, Congress might interpret the Federal 
Reserve’s involvement as a budgetary bailout for the Treasury.  Congress established the 
ESF specifically for the purpose of intervening in the foreign-exchange market, and 
capitalized the fund with an appropriation of $2.0 billion.  In 1945, Congress used $1.8 
billion of ESF funds to pay the U.S. contribution to the IMF.  Karl Bopp, the president of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, argued that these events suggested that 
Congress intended to limit the amount of funds that the ESF could devote to foreign-
exchange operations (FOMC, Minutes, September 12, 1961, pp. 49-50).  If so, then the 
System’s unlimited participation with the ESF might appear as a method of 
circumventing Congress’s budgetary authority.  If the ESF wanted more funds for 
intervention, it should seek a larger Congressional appropriation.
30  Moreover, the ESF 
made loans to developing countries and currently had a substantial amount committed to 
Latin America.  These were essentially foreign policy actions related to State Department 
functions.  Might Congress view the Federal Reserve’s foreign-exchange operations as a 
back-door means of financing these foreign-policy operations?  Could the Federal   30
Reserve become embroiled in a dispute among Congress, the Treasury, and the State 
Department about foreign policy?   
  A second FOMC concern focused on the bureaucratic authority for intervention 
and its implication for Federal Reserve independence.  Congress created the ESF and 
vested the Treasury with primary responsibility for intervention in part because of its 
dissatisfaction with Fed interventions during the 1920s and 1930s.  If the Treasury had 
primary responsibility for intervention, as Chairman Martin acknowledged, could it direct 
how the Federal Reserve operated for the System account?  The U.S. secretary of the 
treasury, the nation’s primary financial officer, is responsible to both the president and 
the Congress of the United States for formulating and implementing all U.S. financial 
policies, and the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 gave the Treasury primary responsibility for 
intervention.  If, as the FOMC now claimed, the Federal Reserve Act authorized the 
System to independently conduct foreign-exchange operations, the potential for conflict 
with the Treasury existed.  At a minimum, the System’s foreign-exchange operations 
cannot act in a way contrary to U.S. international financial policies (FOMC, Task Force 
Paper #6, 1990).  In subsequent testimony before the House Committee on Banking and 
Currency, Chairman Martin pledged to avoid conflicts with the Treasury in conducting 
the System’s intervention operations, saying “the System will, of course, coordinate its 
foreign-exchange operations with those of the Treasury Stabilization Fund” (quoted in 
FOMC, Task Force Paper #6, 1990, p. 1).  Coordination would be on a day-to-day basis.  
In addition, the Board staff assumed that the Treasury could not direct the Federal 
Reserve in operations for the System’s account (FOMC, Minutes, September 12, 1961, p. 
51).  In a December 18, 1961, letter to Chairman Martin, Treasury Secretary Dillion   31
pledged, “the Treasury on its part would naturally want to avoid impinging on the 
independence of the Federal Reserve System within the Government.”
 31 The lines of 
authority were not clearly defined in the early 1960s, and experience would show that the 
Treasury’s preeminence in the area would only occasionally create difficulties for the 
Federal Reserve System (as when the System later sought to terminate its swap drawings 
with Belgium).   
  On the surface, the third concern focused on the ability of the Federal Reserve to 
respond quickly to speculative attacks against the dollar, but underlying this may have 
been a deeper concern about who would actually run the show within the Fed and how it 
would affect the relative authority of the FOMC, the Board of Governors, and the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York.  Many within the Federal Reserve System thought that a 
special subcommittee of the FOMC was necessary to directly oversee foreign-exchange 
intervention because an emergency situation could quickly arise when the full committee 
was unavailable for consultation and immediate decisions.  Making a quick response time 
all the more crucial, the Fed needed to coordinate most operations with foreign central 
banks, which might be five or even twelve hours ahead.  In a memorandum dated 
February 8, 1962, the Board’s General Counsel, Howard Hackley, recommended that 
foreign-exchange operations be put under the supervision of the Board of Governors 
instead of the FOMC.  The Board meets almost daily and has foreign-exchange experts 
on staff.  Moreover, while Hackley contended that the law allowing the Fed to engage in 
foreign-exchange operations was clear, he also argued that giving control to the Board of 
Governors instead of the FOMC was “…more defensible from a legal standpoint.” 
(FOMC, Minutes, February 13, 1962, p. 64).  Others, including Governor Robertson, who   32
opposed Hackley’s interpretation of the Federal Reserve’s authority for intervention, and 
the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, W. D. Fulton, supported Hackley 
by arguing that the Board was more of a “public body” than the FOMC.  Apparently, 
because elected officials appointed governors, but not Federal Reserve Bank presidents, 
the former had more authority to deal with issues that touched the fringe of foreign policy 
than the latter.  The president of the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank, Eliot Swan, 
however, articulated the underlying concern with Hackley’s recommendation:  “To shift 
from the Committee to the Board might give support to those who would like to change 
rather basically the fundamental structure of the System.” (FOMC, Minutes, February 13, 
1962, p. 68).     
While most participants favored maintaining FOMC authority, many thought that 
a smaller management group was necessary to deal with emergency situations.  At issue 
was the extent of a subcommittee’s authority.  A subcommittee with broad authority 
might not confine its activities to administration, but would instead actually make policy 
(FOMC, Minutes, December 5, 1961, p. 71).  Ultimately, the FOMC decided to authorize 
a committee consisting of the chairman and the vice chairman of the FOMC and the vice 
chairman of the Board to conduct operations when the full committee was unavailable.  
The subcommittee, however, was to act within FOMC guidelines, which we discuss 
below.  This subcommittee could, however, set maximum amounts of individual currency 
holdings, establish exchange-rate limits, review and approve any agreements between the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and foreign central banks, and take emergency 
actions when the full FOMC was unavailable.     33
  Chairman Martin also wanted the special manager, who actually undertook 
intervention operations through the Foreign Exchange Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, to be an employee of the FOMC and not, as currently was the case, an 
employee of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  Not surprisingly, the president of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York objected that this move would reduce the bank’s 
authority—specifically the authority of its directors—and wanted to maintain the current 
set-up.  The FOMC, however, accepted the chairman’s recommendation and the special 
manager became an employee of the FOMC (FOMC, Minutes, April 17, 1962 pp. 2-3).   
  A final issue focused on the exact role of intervention.  Policy makers at the 
Federal Reserve all seemed to agree that the broad objective of intervention was to 
defend the dollar, thereby reducing gold outflows and bolstering confidence in the 
dollar’s parity.  But how extensive should these operations be?  At one point, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York suggested undertaking seasonal and cyclical interventions to 
smooth out anticipated balance-of-payments flows (FOMC, Minutes, December 5, 1961, 
p. 49).  Some FOMC members, however, were concerned that prolonged intervention 
might actually interfere with balance-of-payments adjustment and actually prolong 
disequilibrium.  Governor Mitchell argued that if a foreign country had a balance-of-
payments surplus and wanted to acquire gold, the United States should accommodate that 
country.  The United States, therefore, needed a policy to facilitate an orderly loss of 
gold.  Intervention might prevent a sudden loss of gold, but the danger was that absent a 
fundamental policy change, the demand for gold would grow and eventually worsen 
confidence in the official gold price.  Similarly, Governor King feared that “people would 
be likely to put too much reliance on these operations to guard the dollar…” (FOMC,   34
Minutes, September 12, 1961, p. 55).  Governor Roberts also feared that if the Fed 
repeatedly disrupted the private market’s pricing process, the willingness of private 
market participants to make a market in foreign exchange might deteriorate (FOMC, 
Minutes, December 5, 1961, p. 60).  For these reasons, the FOMC favored only 
temporary interventions that would offset transitional, disequilibrating disruptions in the 
foreign-exchange market and that would not attempt to avoid fundamental market 
adjustments.  As time would tell, however, distinguishing between temporary, 
disequilibrating developments and those of a more fundamental nature was difficult.
32   
 
As time would tell, however, it became increasingly difficult to distinguish between 
temporary, disequilibrating developments and those requiring a more fundamental 
adjustment.   
4.3.  A Cautious Approach 
  Most FOMC members favored intervention and were sympathetic to Hackley’s 
interpretation of the Federal Reserve Act.  Nevertheless, they wanted to proceed 
cautiously and to first seek, with the cooperation of the Treasury, legislative clarification 
from Congress (FOMC, Minutes, December 5, 1961, pp. 78-79).  In the face of this 
hesitancy, Chairman Martin, Alfred Hayes, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, and Charles Coombs, first vice president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, stressed that foreign-exchange markets were currently very sensitive to speculative 
pressures.  They argued for going forward on an emergency basis and seeking 
Congressional approval afterwards.  (The Treasury made a similar appeal.)  The sense of 
urgency swayed the FOMC.  While urgency was the chairman’s stated motivation, he   35
also may have hoped to avoid a full-fledged Congressional review of the System’s role in 
intervention, especially, one that might provide an opportunity for other changes in the 
Federal Reserve Act.
33  
On January 23, 1962, with two members dissenting, the FOMC approved foreign-
exchange operations for the System’s account on an experimental basis (FOMC, Minutes, 
January 23, 1962, p. 41).  Governor Mitchell objected, contending that the System first 
needed Congress’s explicit approval.  Similarly, Governor Roberts dissented, arguing that 
the Federal Reserve Act did not clearly authorize these types of stabilization actions, that 
the FOMC was basing its decision on incidental authority in the Act, and that Congress 
intended to confer only limited authority for such actions to the Treasury’s ESF.
34   
  In late February 1962, Chairman Martin reported to the House Committee on 
Banking and Exchange that the Federal Reserve “had recently decided to reenter the field 
of foreign-exchange transactions.”  He reported that the general counsel for the U. S. 
Treasury and the attorney general of the United States concurred with Hackley’s 
interpretation of the legal basis for the FOMC’s decision.  In general, the U.S. Congress 
accepted the Federal Reserve’s interpretation of its authority.  Representatives Henry 
Reuss and Wright Patman, however, did not agree.  Representative Reuss contended: 
Much of the operation that you are doing…seems to me to 
duplicate the foreign exchange stabilization operation that 
the Secretary of the Treasury has very properly undertaken 
pursuant to the Gold Reserve Act of 1934.  To me this is a 
tremendous power you have taken upon yourself, and I 
must serve notice on you right now that I consider this an 
usurpation of the powers of Congress…  You come in here 
and tell us that you propose to go off on, if I may say so, a 
frolic of your own, involving unspecified sums without the 
slightest statutory guidance.”  (quoted in Hetzel, 1996) 
   36
  The System has since reported on its foreign-exchange operations, and Congress 
has been aware of its activities.  In the 1980s, under the Monetary Control Act, Congress 
amended section 14(B)(1) of the Federal Reserve Act to allow the System to invest 
foreign currencies acquired through its foreign-exchange operations in short-term foreign 
government securities.
35  The FOMC has interpreted this as tacit Congressional approval 
of the Federal Reserve’s foreign-exchange operations.  Serious concern about the legal 
authority of the Federal Reserve’s intervention activities never again arose within the 
FOMC.  Instead, concern focused on how intervention conducted in conjunction with the 
Treasury and, especially, warehousing might interfere with Federal Reserve 
independence and the credibility of monetary policy (see Broaddus and Goodfriend, 
1996, and Hetzel, 1996).   
4.4.  Operations 
On February 13, 1962, the FOMC approved the Authorization Regarding Open 
Market Transactions in Foreign Currencies, the Guidelines for System Foreign Currency 
Operations, and the Continuing Authority Directive on System Foreign Currency 
Operations.  These documents provided the FOMC’s instructions to the Subcommittee of 
Foreign Exchange, the special manager, and the Foreign Exchange Desk of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York for undertaking foreign-exchange operations for the 
System’s account.   
 The  Authorization lists the broad and specific goals of the operations, and 
sanctions specific types of transactions.  As stated in this document, the basic purposes of 
the operations were:  (1) to safeguard the value of the dollar, (2) to improve the efficiency 
of payments by avoiding disorderly conditions, (3) to promote monetary cooperation   37
among central banks and international organizations, (4) to moderate temporary 
international payments imbalances that might adversely affect reserves, and (5) to foster 
growth in international liquidity compatible with the needs of an expanding world 
economy.  In addition to these basic purposes, the document also listed more specific 
aims for the Federal Reserve’s transactions.  These were:  (1) to protect the U.S. gold 
reserve from international payments flows stemming from temporary disequilibrating 
forces or transitional market unsettlement, (2) to temper abrupt changes in spot rates and 
moderate forward premia and discounts judged to be disequilibrating, (3) to supplement 
exchange arrangements such as those made through the IMF, and (4) to provide a means 
whereby reciprocal holdings of foreign currencies might contribute to international 
liquidity needs.   The Authorization allowed spot and forward transactions at prevailing 
rates in both U.S. and foreign markets and allowed transactions with the ESF.   
 The  Authorization also provides guidance with respect to communications.  
Besides keeping the FOMC informed of the operations, the Authorization required close 
consultation with foreign central banks, and also instructed the chairman to keep the 
secretary of the treasury fully advised about System foreign currency operations.  The 
chairman was to consult with the secretary on all matters that related to Treasury 
responsibilities, and the Federal Reserve staff was to transmit all pertinent information 
about System foreign-currency operations to the U.S. Treasury.  A daily conference call 
would take place among representatives of the Federal Reserve Board, the Treasury, and 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (see U.S. Treasury, Memorandum, 1962, pp. 5-
6).  At this call, participants would discuss current market conditions and any planned 
operations.  At the end of the day, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York would provide   38
all principals a summary of the day’s operations.  The Authorization also instructed the 
chairman to report periodically to the National Advisory Council on International 
Monetary and Financial Problems.  The FOMC also understood that the System and the 
Treasury would consult before “either entered into any agreements with foreign central 
banks or governments regarding possible foreign-currency operations.” (FOMC, Minutes, 
February 13, 1962, p. 93).  The Authorization established the aforementioned 
subcommittee for foreign-exchange operations to instruct the special manager when the 
full FOMC was unavailable.   
 The  Guidelines are more explicit with respect to current operations.  On February 
13, 1962, they limited the holdings of foreign currency to an amount that would allow the 
Foreign-Exchange Desk to “exert a market influence,” and to cover outstanding forward 
commitments.  It also instructed the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on operating 
procedures.  The desk was to transact at prevailing exchange rates and was not to attempt 
to establish rates that were inconsistent with underlying market forces.  Absent explicit 
authorization to the contrary, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was to purchase 
foreign currencies at, or below their par values and was to lower the purchase rate that it 
paid for any foreign currency as the amount that the Bank held approached the limits that 
the FOMC set.  The Federal Reserve Bank of New York was to follow a similar 
technique for sales of foreign exchange.  The document also required that operations be 
coordinated in the sense of not acting at cross purposes with another central bank.    
 The  Guidelines indicated that spot intervention was appropriate “whenever 
exchange-market instability threatens to produce disorderly conditions” and listed some 
conditions (e.g., political tensions, wide interest-rate differentials) that might signal such   39
developments.  Forward operations were appropriate when forward premia or discounts 
were inconsistent with interest-rate differentials or when such forward operations 
“encouraged the retention or accumulation of dollar holdings abroad.”  This latter 
condition allowed for swap transactions.  The Guidelines also allowed the FOMC to take 
over outstanding forward contracts that the ESF originated.  The System also agreed to 
purchase foreign currencies that the Treasury acquired under existing credit arrangements 
with foreign central banks and governments and to do likewise—after consultation—in 
the future, and to buy foreign currencies that the Treasury acquired from the IMF 
(FOMC, Minutes, February 13, 1964, p. 94).  Moreover, the System agreed “to purchase 
currencies…from the Treasury either outright or under mutually satisfactory resale 
agreement [warehousing], in the event that exchange-market developments obliged the 
Fund to exhaust available resources.” (FOMC, Minutes, February 13, 1964, p. 94).    
 The  initial  Continuing Authority sanctioned transactions in:  British pounds, 
French francs, German marks, Italian lira, Netherlands guilders, and Swiss francs, with 
total holdings not to exceed $500 million.  This limitation would frequently change to 
accommodate broader operations.  
4.5.  Acquiring an Initial Position   
With a balance-of-payments deficit and the dollar often trading at the lower end 
of parity bands, the Fed needed foreign exchange to mount a dollar defense, but any 
purchase of foreign exchange would supply more dollars to the market, put additional 
downward pressure on the dollar, and increase the potential drain of U.S. monetary gold 
(see U.S. Treasury, Memorandum, 1962).  The Fed looked to acquire a small amount of 
foreign exchange from the market or from foreign central banks whenever a fortuitous   40
opportunity presented itself, and some occasions arose in early 1962.  In addition, the 
Treasury sold outright to the Federal Reserve System $32 million equivalent German 
marks in February and March, and $0.5 million equivalent each in Swiss francs, 
Netherlands guilder, and Italian lira (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1963, tables 3, 
6, and 7).  The Treasury also agreed to sell to the Federal Reserve System, either outright 
or through repurchase agreements, currencies held by the ESF, if the ESF exhausted its 
available dollar funds for foreign-exchange operations.  These currencies permitted the 
System to open accounts with the central banks of Germany, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, and Italy.  The System already had British sterling and French francs in 
accounts with the Bank of England and with the Bank of France (FOMC, Scope and 
Character, 1962, p. 1).
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The System also established a series of reciprocal currency arrangements—the 
swap network—with major central banks.  Swaps are standard foreign-exchange-market 
transactions in which parties simultaneously undertake spot and offsetting forward 
transactions at agreed prices and settlement dates.  The swap network provided the 
System and foreign central banks an off-market means of financing interventions during 
the Bretton Woods era.  By the end of 1962, the Federal Reserve System’s swap network 
totaled $900 million and included nine countries and the Bank for International 
Settlements (see table 1).  By 1973, the network grew to $17.4 billion (see figure 5).    
5.  Conclusion 
  By mid-1962, U.S. monetary authorities had established the necessary 
institutional arrangements for defending the U.S. gold stock and ultimately the official 
dollar price of gold against temporary speculative financial flows.  Chiefly by providing   41
foreigners—usually monetary authorities—with cover for their excess dollar exposures, 
swaps and foreign-currency-denominated securities encouraged them to maintain these 
positions instead of converting them to gold.  To this end, these arrangements were 
eminently successful.   
  These policies ultimately failed, however, because U.S. policy makers predicated 
their construction on a false premise.  At the time, U.S. policy makers viewed the 
deterioration in the U.S. balance of payments after 1957 as a temporary phenomenon—
one that would reverse itself.  They failed—or refused—to recognize emerging balance-
of-payments and gold-market patterns—specifically the relationship between dollar 
liabilities and the U.S. gold stock—as evidence of a fundamental problem with the 
Bretton Woods system.  They failed to undertake a real dollar depreciation to stem the 
persistent U.S. balance-of-payments deficit and to devise a mechanism for providing 
reserves that were not tied to the U.S. dollar and ultimately linked to a U.S. balance-of-
payments deficit.  To the extend that these mechanisms for intervention delayed the 
necessary adjustments, they did little more than delay the ultimate unfolding of the 
Bretton Woods system and in so doing, may have made the collapse worse than it 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1  For an overview of Bretton Woods see:  Meltzer (1991), Bordo (1993), and James 
(1996).  Previous discussions of U.S. intervention during the period include Pauls (1990), 
Todd (1992), and Hetzel (1996).   
 
2  Article VI of the IMF Articles of Agreement authorized restrictions on financial flows.   
 
3   Pauls (1990, p.894) claims:  “The Federal Reserve had operated on a very limited ad 
hoc basis for its own account in the forward exchange market in 1961.”  We have not 
been able to verify this in official documents.   
 
4   Meltzer (1991, 2005), Broaddus and Goodfriend (1996), Hetzel (1996), and Todd 
(1999) have explored these themes.   
 
5  Although we only consider Triffin’s paradox in this paper, two other factors 
contributed to the demise of the Bretton Woods system.  The second problem underlying 
the unraveling of Bretton Woods was an unacceptable rise in U.S. inflation beginning in 
1965.  This exacerbated Triffin’s paradox by forcing other countries to hold even more 
dollars.  Once President Nixon closed the gold window in 1971, foreign nations that were 
unwilling to inflate along with the United States either could impose costly and disruptive 
restraints on international transactions or float their currencies.  In March 1973, they 
generally chose the latter.  The third factor was shortcomings associated with the 
adjustment of cross rates within the system.  Although cross-rate-adjustment problems 
stemmed from economic developments within specific foreign countries and not directly 
from the persistent U.S. balance-of-payments deficits, they contributed to the dollar’s 
difficulties because they created uncertainty about the entire Bretton Woods parity 
structure, and because they induced speculative flows from deficit countries to surplus 
countries, which passed through dollars and added to the large, often unwanted dollar 
positions of surplus countries.   
 
6   To construct the real price of gold, we deflate the official price using the nonseasonally 
adjusted consumer price index, 1982-84 =100.   
 
7   All U.S. balance-of-payments data are from the U.S. Commerce Department as 
reported in the Economic Report of the President, 1969.   
 
8  Triffin (1960) suggested creating a source of non-dollar international reserves through 
the IMF.  The IMF first issues Special Drawing Rights in January 1970.   
 
9   Unless otherwise indicated, data on gold in this section are from Board of Governors 
(1976) tables 14.1 & 14.3.    
 
10  These figures include a $344 million payment (gold subscription) to the IMF in 1959.   
   46
                                                                                                                                                 
11  Until 1968, U.S. law mandated a 25% gold reserve requirement on outstanding notes 
and liabilities of the Federal Reserve Banks.     
 
12  Budget deficit data are from the Economic Report of the President (2005), Table B-78, 
and include on-budget and off-budget balances.   
 
13   Maisel (1973, pp. 221-222), who served as a Federal Reserve governor, estimates that 
“international consideration caused a change in the actual target of the FOMC, during the 
period I served on the Fed [1965-1972], from what it would have been on purely 
domestic grounds in only eight out of more than one hundred directives.  In some 
additional cases, the directive was shaded, but not drastically, because of international 
reserve flows.”   
 
14   Eventually, policy makers referred to this program as “Operation Nudge” and later 
still as “Operation Twist.”   
 
15   Bordo, Humpage, and Schwartz (forthcoming) discusses the Gold Pool in detail.   
  
16   Unless otherwise indicated, the information and data in this section about Treasury 
interventions all come from an internal document that the U.S. Treasury prepared and 
transmitted to the Board of Governors.  The document is entitled: “Treasury Experience 
in the Foreign-Exchange Market,” and is hereafter referred to as “U.S. Treasury, 
Experience (1962)” (see References).   
 
17  Congress established the Exchange Stabilization Fund under the Gold Reserve Act of 
1934 for the purpose of foreign-exchange-market intervention.  We discuss the ESF in 
chapter 2 of A History of U.S. Foreign-Exchange-Market Intervention.   
 
18   U.S. Treasury, (1962, p. 721).   
 
19  This statement, of course, ignores the cost of financing and covering the transactions.   
 
20  Debt prepayments stemmed from negotiations between the Eisenhower administration 
and Germany over the cost of troop deployment.   
 
21  Coombs (1962) and Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1963) report different 
amounts for the Swiss franc sales to the SNB in early 1962.  We report data from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1963), p. 7 and p. B-23.  
 
22  The Treasury swaps were on an ad hoc basis.  Unlike the Federal Reserve System, 
which we discuss below, the Treasury did not maintain formal reciprocal swap lines that 
reverted to a standby basis when not drawn down.   
 
23  The analysis in this section draws on the Federal Open Market Committee Minutes of 
September 12, 1961 and December 19, 1961.  See also Hetzel (1996), Todd (1992), and 
FOMC Task Force Paper #1.     47
                                                                                                                                                 
 
24  These data on the ESF are discussed in U.S. Treasury, Memorandum (1962, p. 2).  
U.S. Treasury, Experience (1962) also contains a table showing foreign currency 
holdings.   
 
25  Whether the impetus for the Federal Reserve’s participation in U.S. foreign-exchange 
operations originated with the Treasury or with the Federal Reserve System is not 
entirely clear.  The Treasury’s website suggests that the Treasury “invited” the Federal 
Reserve to participate in the interventions in 1962, and this is the conventional view (see  
www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/esf/history).  The FOMC, Minutes, 
(January 9, 1962, p. 66-67), however, seem to suggest that the Federal Reserve System 
considered foreign-exchange intervention on its own initiative.   
 
26  Although open-market operations, including foreign-exchange interventions, fell 
under the purview of the FOMC, these associated activities fell under the Board of 
Governor’s jurisdiction.   
 
27  In 1920s and 1930s, however, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was providing 
stabilization funds to foreign central banks; it was not directly defending the dollar’s 
exchange value.   
 
28  Warehousing refers to a swap transaction between the Federal Reserve System and the 
U.S. Treasury in which the Treasury sells foreign currency to the System for dollars spot 
and buys it back forward at a specific rate and settlement date.   
 
29  Hackley (1962, 19 – 20), however, did not believe that the Federal Reserve could deal 
directly with the IMF in any other than in its capacity as an agent of the Treasury.   
 
30  Why the Treasury did not seek to increase the ESF’s appropriation is unclear.  The 
Treasury may have feared that Congress would only increase the ESF’s appropriation if 
the Treasury would agree to some type of Congressional oversight.  The ESF is unusual 
in that only the president and the secretary of the treasury can review its actions (see 
Schwarz, 2005).   
 
31  A copy of this letter is found in Task Force #2, 1990, appendix A.   
 
32  We develop this theme more fully in the next two essays on Bretton Woods.   
 
33   Robert H. Knight, General Counsel of the Treasury, had warned Hackley that the 
System should move forward without legislation in part because “there was a range of 
ideas on the Hill with regard to the Federal Reserve System, including varying views 
with respect to the operation and organization of the System.  Legislation, if sought, 
might become a vehicle for adding various amendments the nature of which could not be 
foretold.”  See FOMC, Minutes, January 9, 1962, p. 61.   
   48
                                                                                                                                                 
34   Governor Robertson expressed the reasons for his dissent at the December 5, 1961 
FOMC meeting.  See FOMC, Minutes, December 5, 1962, pp. 57-62.  See also Task 
Force #2, pp. 3-4 
 
35  In 1982, with the onset of developing-country-debt problems, some members of 
Congress expressed concern that the Fed might use its authority to invest in foreign 
securities as a means of providing financial assistance to debtor countries (FOMC, Task 
Force #1, pp. 23-24)   
 
36  It is not clear when or how the System obtained these accounts.   
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Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Millions of U.S. dollarsTable 1:  FEDERAL RESERVE RECIPROCAL CURRENY AGREEMENTS, 1962 
Party to Agreement Amount Date of  Term 
($ -- millions) Original Agreement (months)
Bank of France 50 March 1, 1962 3
Bank of England  50 May 31, 1962 3
Netherlands Bank  50 June 13, 1962 3
National Bank of Belgium  50 June 20, 1962 6
Bank of Canada
a 250 June 26, 1962 3
Bank for International Settlements
b 100
C July 16, 1962 3
Swiss National Bank 100 Junly 16, 1962 3
German Federal Bank  50 Augsut 2, 1962 3
Bank of Italy 150 October 18, 1962 3
Austrian National Bank  50 October 25, 1962 3
TOTAL  900
Notes:
a  Announced on June 24, 1962
b  In Swiss francs
c  Increased to $150 million on December 6, 1963
Source:  Federal Reserve System